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The problem. The International Military Tribunal 
which tried Nazi Germany's leaders after the Second World War 
was predicated on the Allied nations' signing of the London 
Charter, which provided the law and procedures for the 
Nuremberg war-crime trials. The Charter is something of a 
landmark, both as a substantive code outlawing crimes against 
the international community and as an instrument establishing 
a procedure for prosecution and trial of such crimes before 
an international court. The f0Cus of this paper will be on 
the category in the charter that deals with crimes against 
peace. which consist of conspiring to wage. initiating, or 
waging a war of aggression. 
Procedure. Examination of relevant documents and 
written analyses. which are available in the Drake Cowles 
and Law School libraries. 
Conclusions. At the London Conference aggressive 
warfare was declared to be an international crime. Whether 
the conferees were codifying a principle generally accepted 
internationally or creating ex £ost facto legislation remains 
a question of substantive process. 
The principle of outlawing aggressive warfare was 
incorporated into the charter of the United Nations. It 
ap~ears doubtful that the United Nations can enforce this 
pr1nciple based on the considerations thatl the United 
Nations has been awarded weak coercive powers; the super-
powers are regionally aligned and have established the 
practice of "collective self-defense" within their respec-
tive regions; any consensual definition of a nation-state is 
lacking, especially with regard to emerging nations; and, the 
nation-states or aspiring nation-states have the universally 
confirmed right to engage in wars of self-determination. 
Overtime if world organization becomes functionally 
oriented. this may provide the key to reordering the nation-
state system and, as a consequence rather than a declared 
goal, end aggressive warfare. 
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Chapter 1 
THE LONDON CONFERENCE AND PROBLEMS OF LEGAL PROCESS 
Although the search for safeguards for the rights of 
men and nations began centuries ago, never before has suc-
cess in this seeking been so imperative. Modern communica-
tions and transportation have brought men closer in their 
destinies. Apart from the potency of new weapons, this 
closeness would be less disturbing if the future were not 
so imperiled by the emergence of modern totalitarianism with 
its tendency to violate the rights of its citizens and of 
neighboring states. 
Opponents of totalitarianism have tried to devise 
defenses against aggression and atrocities. Leaders have 
sought safeguards in several ways I politically, through 
collective security; militarily, through intimidating 
destructive might; and economically, through sanctions or 
elimination of frustrating poverty. 
Another major effort to stop unjust wars and viola-
tions of human rights has been the development of an 
international legal code. Many hope that as individual 
states have curbed internal unrest and made men secure in 
their rights to life, liberty, and property, so the law of 
the nations might check international outlawry. 
Perhaps the most striking illustration of this policy 
was the International Military Tribunal which tried Nazi 
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Germany's leaders after the Second World War. The court 
which judged Hitler's warlords was significant not only 
because of the defendants' rank and the depravity and magni-
tude of their crimes, but also because the Allies sought to 
create a new international law through the Tribunal's deci-
sions. 
The United States, through President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, had joined in rather definite commitments to 
bring such men as the Nazis to justice. As early as August 
21, 1942, the President stated to all mankind that "the time 
will come when they shall have to stand in courts of law in 
the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer 
for their acts."l About two weeks later Roosevelt repeated 
this promise. "It is our intention," he said, "that just 
and sure punishment shall be meted out to the ringleaders 
responsible for the organized murder of thousands of innocent 
persons and the commission of atrocities which have vio-
lated every tenet of the Christian faith. 1I2 Note, however, 
in these presidential proclamations there is no suggestion 
of an international tribunal. In fact, no treaty, precedent, 
or custom was offered to indicate by what method justice 
should be done. 
lFranklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers .. and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, TheYe~r 19ij2, edt Samuel I. Rosenman, 
Vol. XI (New Yorke Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 330. 
2Ibid ., p. 410. 
The first official declaration of policy by the 
American government came in a joint statement by the United 
states, Russia, and Great Britain which was released by the 
Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference on November 1, 1943. 
The document issued a warning to the Axis powers that vio-
lators of the rules of war and humanity would be punished 
in the places where they perpetrated their atrocities. 
Major war criminals. however, because their outrages "have 
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no particular geographical localization • • • will be 
punished by joint decision of the Governments of the Allies,lIl 
By January of 1945 this vague reference to a unified Allied 
trial was expanded and refined into a draft of a proposed 
agreement which the United States submitted to the Foreign 
Ministers of France, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Repub~ics at the San Francisco United Nations 
Conference. 2 Following acceptance of the American program, 
representatives of the four nations met in London on June 26 
to chart a common course of action with regard to a postwar 
lU. S. Dept. of State, Declaration of German Atroc-
ities. U. S. Dept. of State Bulletin 9, November 6, 194) 
(Washington, D.C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 
p. Jl1. 
2rnternational Conference on Military Trials, London, 
"Preface. tt Report of Robert H • Jackson_United States Repre-
sentative to the International Conference on M litaTriale, 
U. S. Dept. of State Publication )080 Wash1ngton, D.Co. 
U. S. Government Printing Office. 1949), p. v. Hereafter 
refer to as ICMT. 
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punishment program. 
This task was concluded on August 8. 1945. when the 
four nations became signatories to the London Agreement. It 
was signed by Robert Falco for France. Sir William Allen 
Jowett for Great Britain, I. N. Nikitchenko and A. Trainin 
for the Soviet Union, and Robert H. Jackson for the United 
States. 1 This document consisted of seven articles t of 
which the first two embody the main thrust. Article I set 
forth the prescribed purpose of the Oonference. 
There shall be established after consultation 
with the Control Council for Germany an International 
Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals 
whose offenses have no particular geographical loca-
tion whether they be accused individually or in 
their capacity as memb2rs of organizations or groups or in both capacities. 
Article II provided that a Charter would be attached to the 
Agreement and that it would designate lithe constitution, 
jurisdiction and functions of the International Military 
T "b I 113 r1 una • • • • 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
annexed to the Agreement of London was a rather longer docu-
ment than the Agreement itself. Part I of this Charter 
dealt with the constitution of the Tribunal. Each signatory 
was to provide one member of the Tribunal and an alternate; 
l IOMT , p. 421. 
2Ibid .• p. 420. 
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each signatory had to be represented by its member or alter-
nate at every session; the members should choose one of 
themselves to be President; the President was to have a 
casting vote on all matters except convictions and sentences, 
for which an affirmative vote of at least three to one was 
required. 
Part II of the Charter, headed "Jurisdiction and 
General Principles," laid down the categories of crime which 
the Tribunal was to consider, defined those crimes, and ruled 
out in advance the defence of superior orders. Part III of 
the Charter required each signatory to designate a Chief 
Prosecutor and constituted the four Chief Prosecutors a com-
mittee to apportion the work between themselves, settle the 
list of accused, prepare and present an indictment and submit 
suggested rules of procedure to the Tribunal. 
Part IV of the Charter laid down certain provisions 
aimed at securing a fair trial for the defendants. Part V 
dealt with the powers of the Tribunal and the conduct of the 
trial; Part VI with judgment and sentence; and Part VII with 
incurred expenses of the Tribunal and the trials. 
Any government of the United Nations, other than the 
signatories, could adhere to the Agreement and, in fact, 
nineteen did so. They were. Australia, Belgium, Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, 
Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. 1 
l rcMT , "Preface," p. viii. 
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This resulted in twenty-three nations joining together to 
proceed against war criminals and to present a common in-
dictment before a single Tribunal. 
At bottom the setting up of the International Military 
Tribunal was not so great an innovation as has often been 
alleged. Each victor has had the right, long established 
and frequently exercised, of trying war criminals before an 
ad hoc military tribunal of its own creation. The innova-
tion lay in the agreement of the several victors to try, at 
the same time, war criminals against whom all wished to 
bring charges. The result of settingup an international 
tribunal meant that each of the accused could be tried once 
only instead of a possible twenty-three times. 1 
A major problem faced by the representatives of the 
four nations at the London Conference was to reconcile their 
conflicting views of legal concepts and traditions. Great 
Britain and the United States are known as common-law 
countries and exemplify the system of law peculiar to 
English-speaking peoples. On the other hand, France and the 
Soviet Union both use variations of what generally may be 
called the Continental system. It was to be expected that 
differences in origin, tradition, and philosophy among these 
legal systems would beget different approaches to the novel 
lpeter Calvocoressi, Nuremberg (New York, MacMillan, 
1948), p. 17· 
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task of dealing with war criminals through the jUdicial 
process. 
Throughout the proceedings of the Conference, there 
appeared to be early agreement and sustained concensus to 
secure for the defendants every reasonable opportunity to 
make a full and free defense. Thus the Charter gave the 
defendant the right to counsel, to present evidence, and to 
cross-examine prosecution witnesses. It required the in-
dictment to include full particulars specifying the charges 
in detail, gave the defendant the right to make any explana-
tion relevant to the charge against him and to have all 
proceedings conducted in, or translated into, his own langu-
age. 1 
At least one of the procedural divergencies among the 
conferring nations worked to the advantage of defendants. 
The Anglo-American system gives a defendant the right, which 
the Continental system usually does not grant, to give evi-
dence in his own behalf under oath. However, Continental 
procedure allows a defendant the right, not accorded by 
Anglo-American practice, to make a final unsworn statement 
to the tribunal at the conclusion of all testimony and after 
summation by lawyers for both sides, without subjecting him-
self to cross-examination. The Charter resolved these dif-
ferences by giving defendants both privileges, permitting 
l ICMT , p. 426. 
them not only to testify in their own defense but also to 
make a final statement to the court. 1 
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According to Robert Jackson. the United States' repre-
sentative at the Conference. the fundamental cleavage during 
the negotiations concerned the function of a judiciary. 
The Soviet views a court as one of the organs 
of government power. a weapon in the hands of the 
ruling class for the purpose of safeguarding its 
interests. It is not strange that those trained 
in that view should find it difficult to accept or 
to understand the Anglo-American idea of a court 
as an independent agency responsible only before 
the law. 2 
The Soviet philosophy of judicial function appears to have 
prevailed over the Anglo-American concept. This observation 
is predicated on the resolution of two procedural matters 
before the delegates I (1) the selection of justices. and 
(2) the rules of evidence. 
The question of including justices from neutral or 
even enemy nations did not arise at the London Conference. 
Rather. it was assumed that there would be four justices at 
Nuremberg, one each from the nations of the Big Four. The 
London Conference did not consider whether nationality con-
stituted a bias, although in the discussion of rules of con-
duct. Jackson indicated his expectation that the nationality 
of the justices might playa role. He saidl 
l rcMT , p. 428. 
2Ibid ., "Preface, It p. vi. 
I suggest that a formula might be found which 
could be adequate to admonish judges who, after 
all, are nationals of our own countries and equally 
interested with ourselves in keeping the trials on 
the level that would not quite so brazenly invite 
accusations against us all. 1 
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The idea of having a trial before judges, some of whom would 
be drawn from neutral countries and/or one from Germany. had 
a certain attraction for those interested in the spirit of 
a II fair" trial. 
A neutral judgment was thought by many to be fairer 
and more impartial than judgment by only the victorious 
nations but in this situation at bar consideration must be 
given to the whole concept of neutrality. Calvocoressi 
states that "impartiality is no longer an attribute of neu-
trality ... 2 He maintains that a state can now only remain 
neutral if it is allowed to, and it makes little or no dif-
ference whether it wants to be neutral or feels neutral. 
Explaining further, he writesl 
In the second World War. Spain was at one point 
eager and ready to enter the fray I yet at the end 
she was classed as neutral. Holland on the other 
hand, and Norway would have been only too content 
with the status of n~utrals; yet during the war they 
became belligerents.) 
When neutrality is conditioned by good fortune and not by 
1 ICMT, p. 102. 
2Calvocoressi, p. 20. 
good feeling, it may cease to provide a useful touchstone 
for impartial judgment. 
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Appointing a German judge to the Tribunal might have 
added something to the value of the proceedings. but it 
would seem to be an arguable point. The condition in which 
Germany was found in 1945. with all powers and functions 
transferred from the then non-existent German government to 
the various occupation forces and no Peace Treaty signed or 
likely to be signed for a long time, it is not easy to see 
how a German judge could have been satisfactorily selected 
or by whom. 
In spite of the difficulty, or even impossibility, of 
selecting neutral or German judges to serve on the Tribunal. 
nearly inexplicable from an American point of view was the 
ease with which the United States acquiesced in the removal 
of barriers to judicial bias following the statement at 
London of the Soviet delegate. I. T. Nikitchenko. 
• • • with regard to the position of the judge 
the Soviet Delegation considers that there is no 
necessity in trials of this sort to accept the 
principle that the judge is a completely disinter-
ested party with no previous knowledge of the case. 
LNikitchenko had just said that the criminals 'have 
already been convicted.~ The case for the 
prosecution is undoubtedly known to the judge be-
fore the trial starts and there is, therefore, no 
necessity to create a sort of fiction that the 
judge is a disinterested person who ha~ no legal 
knowledge of what has happened before. 
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The results at Nuremberg were as follows. The soviet Union 
appointed as its justice General Nikitchenko himselfJ the 
French Government appointed Professor Donnedieu de Vabres& 
the United States appointed former Attorney General Francis 
Biddle; and Great Britain appointed as justice and President 
of the Tribunal, Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence.! The 
appointment of justices only from among the aggrieved and 
victor nations themselves may not invalidate the Tribunal's 
judgment. but it raises serious questions about the Tribunal's 
impartiality. 
Another feature of the Charter was its simplification 
of evidentiary requirements. The document provided that "The 
Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence,,,2 
Technical rules of evidence have long been a landmark of 
Anglo-American systems as a part of their concept of a fair 
trial. Robert Jackson explained the waiving by the United 
States of this historical judicial requirement thusly: 
The peculiar and technical rules of evidence 
developed under the common-law system of jury 
trials to prevent the jury from being influenced 
by improper evidence constitute a complex and 
artificial science to the minds of Continental 
lawyers, whose trials usually are conducted before judges and do not accord the jury the high place 
it occupies in our system. We saw no occasion at 
lEugene Davidson. The Trial of the Germans (New Yorks 
Macmillan, 1966), p. 21. 
the London Conference to insist upon jury rules 
for a trial where no jury would be used. 1 
12 
Concurrence with this opinion is evidenced and further clari-
fied by the statement of the British representative at the 
London Conference, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, who said the 
Tribunal can receive 
••• affidavits or statements for witnesses, 
depositions, recorded examinations before or 
findings of military or other tribunals, copies of 
official reports, publications and documents or 
other evidentiary materials and all such other 
evidence as is customa~ilY received by international 
or military tribunals. 
This evidence included affidavits. diaries, and documents 
including sworn or unsworn statements. Affidavits offer two 
problems for jurists trained in the common law. First. the 
court has no control over the process in which lawyer and 
witness formulate an affidavit. Second. unless the witness 
takes the stand, the content of the affidavit is not subject 
to cross-examination,) Diaries and unsworn documents pose 
even more serious problems. The selection of the justices 
and relaxation of the technical rules of evidence seemed to 
represent a move toward the Soviet concept of the judiciary 
where it serves as a weapon in the hands of the ruling class 
1rcMT , "Preface," p. xi. 
2rcMT • p. 100. 
)Richard Minear, Victor's Justice (Princetonl Prince-
ton University Press, 1971). pp. 119-20. 
(in this instance, the victors), rather than toward the 
Anglo-American concept of the judiciary, being independent 
and responsible only before the law. 
One final procedural decision seems worthy of note. 
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None of the punishments upon result of a conviction at the 
trials were subject to review by another court. 1 In the 
absence of a world-wide legal hierarchy, the fact that this 
was an "international" tribunal made the ruling pragmatic 
but did abuse the principle of Anglo-American law of a guar-
anteed appeal for every conviction. 
It has often been thought that because of deep-rooted 
differences of procedure, the use of the judicial process by 
and among the community of nations is inherently limited. 
That these differences present grave difficulties in so 
adapting the judicial process, the record of the London 
Conference amply attests. That the Conference was able to 
reconcile these divergencies and prescribe on paper a procedure 
acceptable to all four nations is gratifying evidence that our 
fundamental concepts of fair procedure are not in hopeless 
conflict and can be compromised; but the price of the com-
promise has yet to be assessed. 
1 ICMT, p. 428. 
Chapter 2 
PROBLEMS OF' SUBSTANTIVE PROCESS, 
AGGRESSIVE WAR WAS A CRIME 
The Tribunal having been constituted. it is neces-
sary to consider next what acts fell within its purview. 
They are contained in Article 6 of the Charter and divided 
into three broad categoriesl "(a) Crimes against Peace; 
(b) War Crimes; and (c) Crimes against Humanity."l There 
does not appear to be division among jurists and historians 
about the inclusion of the later two categories as charges 
in the indictment. George A. Finch statesl 
No substantial objection lies to the trial of 
such war crimes, to the judgment. or to the execu-
tion of the sentences •••• It is accepted inter-
national law. conventional as well as customary. 
that a belligerent has authority to try and punish 
individuals for crimes which constitute violations 
of the laws and custo~s of war, as well as of the 
laws of humanity ••• 
In 1947 Eugene Davidson wrote: 
••• the other two counts dealt with crimes 
both old and new. The charge of committing war 
lInternational Conference on Military Trials. London. 
Report of Robert H.Jackson United States_Representative to 
~he Il}.ternational Con!erence on MilitarY Trials, U. S. Dept. 
of State Publication 3080 (washington, D.C.I U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1949), p. 423. Hereafter referred to 
as ICMT. 
2George A. Finch, "The Nuremberg 'rrial and Inter-
national Law,1I American Journal of International Law,LKII 
(January, 1947)~O-21. 
crimes had its roots in centuries of warfare ••• 
but the charges of planning and waging aggressivf 
warfare. made its first appearance at Nuremberg. 
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Thus, the Charter declared that aggressive war was a crime. 
This principle of international law. created at London. may 
become in the future more important than any other point 
raised by the trial and will be treated in detail. 
The framers of the Charter did not set out to legis-
late or to create law; they aimed at setting down for the 
first time on paper a statement of the law as it existed in 
the nineteen thirties. 2 This is a very usual thing to do. 
for law comes into being in two different ways and derives 
its force from two different sources. In the first place, 
law may be created by an instrument. the decree of a King 
or the act of a parliament. which lays down new rules or 
alters old ones. In international law there are no such 
legislative instruments. and the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal was not an instrument of this kind. 
The second source from which law is built up is cus-
tom. The Common Law of England. for instance. consists of 
the customs and practices of immemorial usage. and this 
sort of law is not to be sought in the first place in written 
1Eugene Davidson, The Nuremberg Fallacy (New Yorkt 
Macmillan. 1973), pp. 1-2. 
2peter Calvocoressi. Nuremberg (New York. Macmillan. 
1948 ), p. 32. 
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instruments, nor does it depend on written instruments for 
its validity. This kind of law grows gradually, and, at a 
certain point, it generally becomes convenient to reduce it 
to writing and to pUblish the writing by decree or by Act of 
Parliament. Thereafter, the enactment serves as evidence of 
the existence and content of the law, but no such enactment 
is needed to make it law. The main difference created by the 
enactment is that, whereas afterwards the existence and 
meaning of the law can be seen by referring to the Act, 
before the enactment these things have to be proved in dif-
ferent waysJ and a court would have to look for other evi-
dence in order to satisfy itself that the alleged customs 
were generally accepted as law. It is well settled that 
international law. as well as state law, includes custom. 1 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
purported to reduce existing customs. having the force of 
law. to writing. Of course the framers of such an instru-
ment may be wrong. It is always arguable that a particular 
custom was not sufficiently clear or well established to 
have the force of law or that the custom has been misunder-
stood or inadequately expressed in the enactment. If an 
enactment errs in any such respect, then it is no longer 
declaring law but making it--and possibly making bad law at 
that. The question therefore becomes thisl Did the writing 
LIn this case the Charter, Article 6, paragraph (a)] cor-
rectly express the customs which had already acquired the 
force of law, and what is the evidence of this custom and 
conviction? 
Legalists like Sheldon Glueck and Joseph B. Keenan, 
who support the position that such a widespread custom had 
indeed developed, base their judgment on historical inter-
national pronouncements such aSI 
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(1) The agreements limiting the nature of the deeds 
permissible in the extreme event of war. that iS t the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 
1929, regulate the treatment of prisoners of war and amelio-
rate the condition of wounded and ill soldiers. Germany and 
Japan had ratified (with reservations) the 1907 Hague Con-
vention; Italy the 1899 one. Germany and Italy had ratified 
the Geneva Convention respecting prisoners of war. When 
the government of the United States expressed its intention 
to observe that Convention as to both prisoners of war and 
civilian internees during World War II, Japan agreed to do 
likewise. The Hague and Geneva Conventions, to be sure, 
took for granted the legality of war: but, from motives both 
of humanitarianism and mutual prudence, they went so far in 
the direction of limiting the methods of opening hostilities 
LHague Convention, 190.z7 and conducting war as to be Itsign-
posts on the road toward a growing conviction that aggressive 
18 
war must somehow be abolished. h1 
(2) The draft of a treaty of mutual assistance spon-
sored by the League of Nations in 1923 stated (Article I) 
"that aggressive war is an international crime," a.nd that 
the Parties would "undertake tha.t no one of them will be 
guilty of its commission. 1I2 About one-half of the twenty-
nine states which replied to a sUbmission of the draft treaty 
wrote in favor of accepting the text. A major objection was 
that it would be difficult to define what act would compromise 
"aggression," rather than doubt as to the criminalism of 
aggressive war.) The United States was unable to adhere to 
the draft because it was not a member of the League. 
(J) The preamble to the League of Nations' 1924 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes ("Geneva Protocol"), after "recognizing the solidar-
ity of the members of the international community," asserted 
that "e. war of aggression constitutes a viOlation of this 
solidarity and an international crime." It went on to say 
that the contracting parties were "desirous of facilitating 
the complete application of the system provided in the 
lSheldon Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive 
War (New YorkE Knopf, 1959).-p. 27· 
2F • P. Walters. A History of the League of Nations (Londonl Oxford University Press, 19521. p. 22g. 
3 Glueck. p. 29. 
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Covenant of the League of Nations for the paoific settlement 
of disputes between the States and of ensuring the repres-
sion of international crimes. l The Geneva Protocol was 
recommended to the Members of the League of Nations by a 
resoltltion unanimously passed in the Assembly by the vote of 
forty-five Members of the League (including Italy and Japan--
Germany was not as yet a Member), and signed by the repre-
sentatives of many countries. Not only did it definitely 
declare aggressive war to be an international crime. but by 
Article 6 it provided that the sanctions of Article 16 of the 
Covenant of the League shotlld be applicable to a state 
resorting to war in disregard of its undertakings under the 
Protocol. Although it never legally came into force (not, 
however, because of any serious doubt that a war of aggres-
sion could be regarded as an international crime) ,2 the 
historic Protocol of Geneva did express the strong attitude 
of many leading jurists and statesmen regarding both the 
illegality and the criminalism of aggressive war. 
(4) Article 1 of the Draft Treaty of Disarmament and 
Security Prepared by an American Group and considered by the 
Third Committee (on disarmament) of the Assembly of the 
League of Nations, 1924, provides that nThe High Contracting 
Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an inter-
national crime," and "severally undertake not to be guilty of 
2Ibid ., p. 30. 
its commission," while Article 2 provides that "A State 
engaging in war for other than purposes of defence commits 
the international crime described in Article 1. 111 
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(5) An expression of American opinion on aggressive 
war was made on December 12, 1927, when senator William E. 
Borah introduced a resolution, the last in a long series 
since 1922, of which a pertinent provision wasl 
• • • that it is the view of the Senate of the 
United States that war between nations should be 
outlawed as an institution or means of the settle-
ment of international controversies bY2making it a 
public crime under the law of nations. 
(6) At the eighteenth plenary meeting of the Assembly 
of the League of Nations, September 24, 1927, all the dele-
gations (including the German, Italian, and Japanese) having 
pronounced in favor of a Resolution of the Third Committee 
comprising a Declaration Concerning Wars of Aggression, the 
Declaration was declared to be unanimously adopted. 3 The 
preamble to the Declaration statesl 
The Assembly, 
Recognizing the solidarity which unites the com-
munity of nations; 
Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance 
of general peace; 
Being convinced that a war of aggression can never 
serve as a means of settling international disputes 4 
and is, in consequence, an international crime ••. • 
1 Glueck, p. 33. 
4Ibid ., p. 31. 
, . 
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(7) The unanimous Resolution (February 18, 1928) of 
the twenty-one American Republics at the Sixth (Havana) 
Pan-American Conference declared that "war of aggression con-
stitutes an international crime against the human species."l 
(8) At the International Conference of American 
States on Conciliation and Arbitration, assembled in 
Washington in December. 1928. representatives of all twenty 
republics at the Conference signed a General Convention of 
Inter-American Conciliation. of which the preamble contains 
the statement, "desiring to demonstrate that the condemnation 
of war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual 
relations" set forth in the Havana Resolution. "constitutes 
one of the fundamental bases of inter-American rela-
tions. ,,2 • • • 
(9) The Pact of Paris. or the Briand-Kellogg Pact. 
named after the two ministers of foreign affairs who drafted 
it. was signed in Paris on August 27. 1928. The treaty 
entered into force on July 24. 1929. with forty-six States 
depositing ratifications or instruments of adhesion and 
sixteen more then signifying their intention to adhere to 
the treaty. 3 
2Bulletin of the Pan American Union. LXIII. December. 
1929 (Washington. D.C 01 U. S: Government Printing Office t 
1930). 114. 
3Glueck, p. 17· 
The first two articles of the Pact read thuslYI 
Article II The High Oontracting Parties solemnly 
declare in the names of their respective peoples 
that they condemn recourse to war for the solution 
of international controversies. and renounce it as an 
instrument of national policy in their relations 
with one another. 
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Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree 
that the settlement or solution of all disputes or 
conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin 
they may be. which may arise among them'lshall 
never be sought except by pacific means. 
This Pact, however, failed to make violations of its terms 
international crimes punishable either by an international 
tribunal or by national courts. But. some interpreted the 
treaty as containing broad future implications. United 
States' Senator Arthur Capper. commenting on his resolution 
favoring the efforts of Briand. saidl 
There is every reason to consider this proposal 
for civilized nations to renounce war as an instru-
ment of public policy, a logical and necessary step 
toward peace. It goes farther, it seems to me, 
than merely declaring war criminal. 2 
(10) Finally. the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression 
and Conciliation signed at Rio de Janeiro. October 10, 1933. 
was ratified by twenty-five States, including the United 
States of America. The preamble to that treaty states that 
lSamuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United 
States (New York. Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 725· 
2James T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National 
Policy (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1929), p. 97· 
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the Parties were entering into the agreement Uto the end of 
condemning wars of aggression and territorial acquisitions 
that may be obtained by armed conquest, making them impos-
sible and establishing their invalidity ... l 
The above international pronoun.cements constituted 
for some a recognition that aggressive war was a crime; 
however. prior to and during the London Conference, serious 
doubt about the issue was evident. 
1 Glueck, p. 32. 
Chapter 3 
PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANTIVE PROCESS: 
AGGRESSIVE WAR WAS NOT A CRIME 
The unsettled state of international law was a con-
troversial aspect of the Nuremberg Trials. The Allies 
wished to prosecute their German enemies not simply for 
conventional war crimes, but also for "crimes against peace," 
a criminal category of highly uncertain status in inter-
national law. If the prosecution wished to protect itself 
from the charge of ~Qst facto legislation. it had to 
argue that international conventions such as the Pact of 
Paris had established certain acts as crimes, or that cer-
tain acts were recognized as crimes by "all civilized 
nations," or that the designation of these acts as crim-
inal was a natural and logical extension of existing prin-
ciples of international law. This position was presented 
in the preceding chapter. The argument that the representa-
tives at the London Conference initiated new principles of 
international law, rather than codifying existing customs, 
will be examined next. 
Is conspiring to or waging an aggressive war a crime 
at international law? In its aide-memoire of April 23, 
1945. the British government admitted serious doubt with 
regard to this question: 
Reference has been made to Hitler's conduct 
leading up to the war as one of the crimes on 
which the Allies should rely. There should be 
included in this the unprovoked attacks which, 
since the original declaration of war, he has 
made on various countries. These are not war 
crimes in the ordmnary sense, nor is it at all 
clear that they can proprrly be described as crimes 
under international law. 
At the London Conference the French delegation expressed 
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grave concern about affirming that aggressive war was indeed 
illegal at that time. 
We do not consider as a criminal violation 
the launching of a war of aggression. If we de-
clare war a criminal act of individuals. we are 
going farther than the actual law. We think that 
in the next years any state which will launch a 
war of aggression will bear criminal responsibility, 
morally and politically; but on the basis of inter-
national law as it stands today. we do not believe 
these conclusions are right ••.• We do not want 
criticism in later years of punishing something 
that was not actuall~ criminal. such as launching 
a war of aggression. 
During the discussions at London leading up to the 
Agreement. establishing the criminality of aggressive war. 
as apart from conventional war crimes committed in the course 
of war. was important primarily to the American side.) 
lInternational Conference on Military Trials. London, 
Report of Robert H. Jackson United States Representative to 
the International-Conference on Military Trials. U. S. Dept. 
of State Publication )080 TWashington. D.C.r U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office. 1949). pp. )8)-84. Hereafter referred 
to as ICMT. 
2Ibid •• p. 295. 
)Richard H. Minear, Victors' Justice (Princetonl 
Princeton University Press. 1971):-P:~47. -
Robert Jackson, the United States representative argued: 
Germany did not attack or invade the United 
States in violation of any treaty with us. The 
thing that led us to take sides in this war was 
that we regarded Germany's resort to war as illegal 
from its outset, as an illegitimate attack on the 
international peace and order. And throughout the 
efforts to extend aid to the peoples that were 
under attack, the justification was made by the 
Secretary of State, by the Secretary of War, Mr. 
Stimson, by myself as Attorney General. that this 
war was illegal from the outset and hence we were not 
doing an illegal thing in extending aid to people who 
were unjustly and unlawfully attacked. No one ex-
cuses Germany for launching a war of aggression 
because she had grievance, for we do not intend 
entering into a trial of whether she had grievances. 
If she had real grievances. an attack on the peace 
of the world was not her remedy. Now we come to 
the end and have crushed her aggression, and we do 
want to show that this war was an illegal plan of 
aggression. 1 
The United States lacked the traditional justification for 
going to war, that of defense; and yet the United States had 
joined the fight against Germany. The position of the 
United States toward the principle of self-defense had been 
clearly set forth by former Secretary of State Frank B. 
Kellogg. Speaking for the American intent as a party to 
the Pact of Paris he saidl 
The right of self-defense is inherent in every 
sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. 
Every nation is free at all times and regardless 
of treaty provisions to defend its territory from 
attack or invasion and it alone is competent to 
l ICMT , pp. )8)-84. 
decide whether circumstances require recourse to 
war in self-defense. 1 
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Testifying before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Kellogg was even more categorical: 
I knew that this government, at least, would 
never agree to sUbmit to any tribunal the question 
of self-defense, and I do not think any of them 
[the other governmentg? would. 2 
That Senate committee reported the Paris Pact to the United 
States in the following unequivocal terms I 
The committee reports the treaty with the 
understanding that the right of self-defense is 
in no way curtailed or impaired by the terms or 
conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free 
at all times and regardless of the treaty provi-
sions to defend itself, and is the sole judge of 
what constitutes the right of self-de£inse and 
the necessity and extent of the same. The United 
States regards the Monroe DoctrineJas a part of 
its national security and defense. 
Since the United States did not enter World War II in an act 
of self-defense, but rather to "aid peoples under attack," 
Jackson's argument that the Germans waged an aggressive war 
may have consituted a request for international approval of 
lU. S. Dept. of State, Treaty for the Renunciat~on of 
War, 1928 (Washington, D.Cd U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1933), pp. 57-59. 
2U. S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, General Pact for the Renunciation of War. Hearing. 
70th Cong., 2d Sesso, December 7. 1928 {Washington. D.C.e U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1929), p. 4. 
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American policy. 
In Article VI of the Charter, participation in a com-
mon plan or conspira£X to wage a war of aggression was de-
clared to be criminal. 1 The question arisess Why should 
the Allies have charged conspiracy, rather than simply the 
commission of the various crimes alleged? From the legal 
point of view, the net of conspiracy could be as wide as the 
prosecution wished to make it. Also, the establishment of 
such conspiracy at the major trial at Nuremberg would have 
greatly facilitated the prosecution of lesser enemy figures 
at later trials. 2 If the existence of the conspiracy were 
established at the first trial, later tribunals could take 
judicial notice of that fact and concentrate solely on the 
issue of the involvement of later defendants in that con-
spiracy. The major trial at Nuremberg, in fact, was followed 
by other trials. 
Between the autumn of 1945 and March, 1948, 
about 1,000 cases involving some 3,500 persons 
were tried in many countries on the Continent 
before Allied courts, although the United Nations 
War Crimes Commission had compiled a list of 
36,800 names of men who were either to be held as 
material witnesses or against whom it was con-
sidered likely a case could be made • • • In the 
United States courts in Nuremberg, in the period 
from July, 1945, until July, 1949, 199 people 
were tried •••• 3 
2Eugene Davidson, The Trialof the Germans (New Yorks 
Macmillan, 1966), pp. 28-29· 
3Minear, p. 38. 
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Is conspiracy, as opposed to the actual commission of 
an act, a crime in international law? This question arose 
at the London Conference, and one of the nations involved 
responded negatively to it. The British representative 
said. "We have a conception of conspiracy in our law and 
would like to know whether you have it too. 1I In response, 
the French delegate replied, "No, we do not have that con-
ception of conspiracy. We would have to make new law. IIl 
Prior to the Conference, Francis B. Sayre wrote this 
concerning conspiracy. 
It is a doctrine as anomalous and provincial 
as it is unhappy in its results. It is utterly 
unknown to the Roman law; it is not found in 
modern Continental codes; few Continental lawyers 
ever heard of it.2 
Not only is it peCUliar to English law, continued Sayre, but 
it is also dangerous. 
Under such a principle everyone who acts in 
cooperation with another may some day find his 
liberty dependent upon the innate prejudices or 
social bias of an unknown judge. It is)the very 
antithesis of justice according to law. 
Although the American government urged at the London 
Conference that aggressive war was a crime, only one year 
earlier the Americans had concurred with others that it was 
l rcMT , p. 296. 
2Francis B. Sayre, "Criminal Conspiracy," Harvard Law 
Review, XXXV (1922), 427. 
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not a crime. The legal committee of the United Nation's War 
Crimes Commission had discussed the issue in 1944, conclud-
ing that aggression was a crime; but the Commission itself 
had not adopted this position, Itthe feeling prevailing that 
the Governments would be reluctant to go so far. IIl Instead, 
the matter was referred to a subcommittee of four, representa-
tives of Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, and 
the United States. Of these four, only Czechoslovakia dis-
sented from the majority report which held that. 
Acts committed by individuals merely for the 
purpose of preparing for and launching aggressive 
war, are • • . not I war crimes. I However, such 
acts and especially the acts and outrages against 
the principles of the laws of nations and against 
international good faith perpetrated by the 
responsible leaders of the Axis powers and their 
satellites in preparing and launching this war are 
of such gravity that they should be made the sub-
ject of a formal condemnation in the peace treaties. 
It is desirable that for the future penal sanctions 
should be provided for such grave outrages agaiE-st 
the elementary principles of international law. 
This report and the Czech dissent were the subject of discus-
sion on the part of the whole Commission-
Though the representatives of Australia. China, New 
Zealand. Poland, and Yugoslavia supported the Czech position, 
the United states did not. nor did France, Great Britain, 
the Netherlands and Greece. The matter was left to be referred 
lUnited Nations War Crimes Commission, Histor'y_Qf~he 
United Nations War Crimes Commission (London: Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office,-1948), p. 181. 
2Ibid ., pp. 182, 184-85. 
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to the member nations for instructions, but no resolution 
was ever adopted. Only one year before the London Confer-
ence, three of the four participating nations at the Confer-
ence had agreed that aggressive war was not in itself a 
crime. 
A corollary to the question of the criminality of 
aggressive war is the question, Can aggression be defined? 
The Pact of Paris had not tried to define aggression. The 
Allies at the London Conference did try, but with little 
success. The American attempt at London to define aggres-
sion was designed to limit the scope of the trial. As 
Robert H. Jackson stated. 
There is a very real danger of this trial 
being used ••• for propaganda purposes •••• 
It seems to me that the chief way in which the 
Germans can use this forum as a means of disseminat-
ing propaganda is by accusing other countries of 
various acts which they will say led them to make 
war defensively. That would be ruled out of this 
case if we could find and adopt proper language 
which would define
1
what we mean when we charge a 
war of aggression. 
The United States suggested the following definition: "An 
aggressor • • • is that state which is first to declare war, 
to invade another state, to form a naval blockade, or to 
provide support for insurgent groups.,,2 Here Jackson placed 
heavy emphasis on chronological priority. The definition 
concluded: 
lrCMT, p. 273. 2 r bid., p. 294. 
No political, military, economic, or other 
considerations shall serve as an excuse or justi-
fication for such actions; but exercise of the 
right of legitimate self-defense, that is to say, 
resistance to an act of aggression, or action to 
assist a state which has been subjected to aggrrs-
sion, shall not constitute a war of aggression. 
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For Japkson the essential criminal element was the use of 
force; domination by peaceful means was wholly legal. When 
was resort to force not illegal? In two caseSI self-defense 
and assistance against aggression. Self-defense was not new 
or controversial; but the same could not be said about 
assistance against aggression. It had not been included in 
the Pact of Paris; it had not been mentioned in 1944 when 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission discussed aggres-
sion; but it had an obvious and compelling logic. It justi-
fied the actions of two of the four nations at the Confer-
ence--the United States in its declaration of war on Germany 
and the Soviet Union in its declaration of war on Japan--
which were otherwise of dubious Ifcharacterll in terms of 
international law. 
The Russian delegate at the London Conference, 
General I. T. Nikitchenko, felt that definition of the term 
~gression was unnecessary. He said. 
The policy which has been carried out by the 
Axis powers has been defined as an aggressive 
policy in the various documents of the Allied 
nations and of all the United Nations, and the 
tribunal would really not need to go into that •••• 
The fact that the Nazi leaders are criminals 
has already been established. The task of the 
tribunal is only to determine the measure of 
guilt of each,particular person and mete out the 
necessary punlshment--the sentences. l 
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The only definition acceptable to the Russians would have 
specified that aggression was something Nazi Germany had com-
mitted. Because of this disagreement and because the French 
insisted that defining crimes was beyond the jurisdiction of 
the London Conference, the Charter included no definition of 
aggression. 
A cardinal principle of United States domestic crim-
inal law is that there shall be no retroactive legislation. 
This principle, contained in Article I of the American con-
stitution. is sometimes expressed in the Latin phrasel 
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (unless there 
is a law, there can be no crime; unless there is a law, 
there can be no punishment}.2 According to this prohibition 
an act that was not criminal at the time of commission could 
not be reached by retroactive legislation. To be sure, in 
countries with common-law traditions, there has always been 
some degree of retroactivity, at least in judicial legisla-
tionl Law is made case by case, determined by the judge. 
However, to the extent that the law of the Nuremberg Trials 
was made not at Nuremberg but in London, it is not a case of 
judicial legislation analogous to the role of judges in the 
1 10M'I' , p. 303. 2Minear, p. 60. 
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development of the common law. The conferees at London were 
not judges (although the Soviet representative became a 
Nuremberg judge and the French representative the alternate 
French judge); they were, instead, official representatives 
of their governments. 
At the London Conference, Robert H. Jackson argued 
that defining the law was within the jurisdiction of the 
Conference. He stated: "Our basic purpose is that Article 
6 listing the crimes to come under the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal should settle what the law is for the purposes of 
this trial and end the argument. ,,1 If the crimes 
were not defined in the Charter, thought Jackson, the tri-
bunal might well find the accused guilty of the acts but 
hold that the acts themselves were not crimes. Said Jackson, 
"That, we think, would make the trial a travesty.,,2 
The French delegate quickly took Jackson to task. He 
declaredl 
· there is a difference in saying that, if 
they are convicted in •.. those criminal acts, 
they will be dealt with as major war criminals, and 
declaring those acts as criminal violations of 
international law, which is shocking. It ldeclaring 
those acts to be criminal violationi7 is a creation 
by four people who are just four individuals--de-
fined by those four people as criminal violations of 
international law. Those acts have been known for 
years before and have not been declared criminal vio-
lations of international law. It is ex post facto 
legislation . . • It is declaring a~ settled s?me-
thing discussed for years and settllng a questl0n 
l ICMT , p. 329. 2Ibid ., p. 330. 
as if we were a codification commission. 1 
In spite of the French objection, the Nuremberg Charter in 
its final form read, 
The following acts shall be deemed criminal 
violations of international law, and the Tribunal 
shall have power and jurisdiction to convict any 
person who committed any of them on the part of the 
European Axis countries • • • 
(a) Crimes Against Peacel namely, planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participa-
tion in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) War Crimesl namely, violations of the laws 
or customs of war. Such violations shall include, 
but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose 
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or 
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder 
of public or private property, wanton destruction 
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity; 
(c) Crimes Against Humanity, namely, murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian popula-
tion, before or during the war; or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution 
of or in connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation 2 
of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 
1 ICMT, p. 335. 2Ibid ., p. 423. 
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Chapter 4 
THE NATION-STATE CONCEPT I STATUS OF AND 
IMPLICATION FOH A WORLD UNION 
In November. 1947, the Assembly of the United Nations 
unanimously adopted a resolution that the Nuremberg prin-
ciples would be used by its International Law Commission as 
the basis for formulating the new codes of international 
1 law. It was hoped, then, that through the United Nations 
organization the decisions of France, the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain and the United States made at London in 1945 to out-
law aggressive war could be put into effect. 
In the twentieth century the creation of a world 
union implies two major conditions. (1) a joining together 
of nation-states; and, (2) an agreement of those nation-
states to release part of their sovereignty in order to act 
collectively. 
From a historical perspective, the concept of world 
unity is not new. Peter Calvocoressi states that during the 
last few centuries of the Middle Ages, Western Civilization 
acknowledged certain universal claims and values: the 
Church and Eternal Law. 2 The dominion of the Catholic 
lEugene Davidson, The Nu!,em.!L~f's.; Fallacy (New York; 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 3· 
2peter Calvocoressi, tl~!'~ffiberg (New York: Macmillan t 
1948). p. 126. 
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Church had its limits, since the Empire also maintained 
universal claims in its own sphere; but those claims did not 
affect the universality of the Church's dominion even if 
they prevented it from being a sole universality. The men 
of western Civilization allowed an allegiance to the 
Church without distinction of race or tongue or habitat. 
During the Middle Ages, it was believed that there existed 
an Eternal Law above the laws prevailing in different re-
gions. These laws were human and fallible attempts to 
divine and reproduce the infallible Law. The laws made by 
kings might be wrong; but the Law was never wrong, and kings 
were as much beneath it as anyone else. A king who mistook 
or transgressed the Eternal Law forfeited his royal rights. 
When Western Civilization emerged from the Renaissance and 
Reformation, it was without a universal Church and without 
universal Law. 1 Instead, there were sovereign states, ab-
solute monarchs, and the divine right of kings. 
The king was no longer beneath the Law in the 
mediaeval sense. He might have to share his supreme law-
making powers (e.g., with a Parliament), but the new check 
was national just as the king himself was national. There 
was no check above the statel there was nothing to limit the 
assertiveness of the national sovereign state or the leaders 
of such a state. The result was that the crescendo of 
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discordant claims and ambitions proved soluble only by war. 
The concept that the world community should be organ-
ized on the basis of separate, sovereign nation-states had 
its first impetus out of the settlement of World War I and 
the establishment of the League of Nations; and it was further 
intensified by World War II and the creation of the United 
Nations. 
The classical nation-state system which emerged out 
of the European cultural complex had many distinctive qual-
ities that Lucian Pye believes can no longer be realized 
today.l In that system all the member states shared a rel-
atively common level of technology; so while one might be 
"larger lt or more "powerful" than another, the qUQstion of 
whether one was "superior" and the other Itinferior" was 
neither appropriate nor frequently raised. Above all. Pye 
states, the classical nation-state system was premised upon 
certain assumptions about the nature of a "statel! and about 
the characteristics of "sovereignty.1I Specifically, it was 
assumed that the ultimate test of sovereignty was the abil-
ity of a government to commit the society over which it 
claimed to rule to courses of action of indefinitely long-
t · d . 2 1me uratJ.on. To have sovereignty was to be able to make 
lLucian W. Pye. Aspe6ts of Political DeveloJ2.l!Ient (Bostonl Little, Brown, 19 ~ p. 8. 
2Ibid ., p. 13. 
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treaties and to insure that they were carried out. The con-
cept of sovereignty in classical international law was thus 
directly related to the concept of effective action. 
Pye asserts that, in the present day setting, it is 
clear that sovereignty is no longer tied to the capacity for 
effective action. Sovereignty is seen more often as a uni-
versal right. 1 
Since the end of World War II, half a billion people 
have become citizens of newly-inq.ependent countries. In 
these new countries alone, over thirty million people are 
employed in administering the business of government accord-
ing to their visions of a modern state, and another one 
hundred million depend upon government and politics, both 
civil and military. for their livelihood. Their great ob-
jective is to achieve the impressive elements of organiza-
tion that characterize the modern nation-state. However. 
their almost universal problem is that they have the form 
but not the substance of nationhood, which may create 
international tension. 2 
The historical irony of this age of nation building 
is that the overpowering thrust of nationalism forces people 
to rivet their attention on the nation as the unit of 
2Lucian W. Pye, Polit~Q~L-PersonalitY1_~g Nation 
BU!lQing (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1962), p. 3· 
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self-expression and to discount the worth of the individual, 
and yet the task of nation building calls for precisely the 
opposite orientation of stressing the individual in his 
social role. 1 A further complication is that, since the 
diffusion of the world culture (modernization) can weaken 
and destroy the structure of traditional societies but cannot 
so easily reconstitute a more modernized society, the con-
sequence of the international impact has more often been 
chaos and tension rather than a new order. It seems that 
the destruction of old relationships has proceeded at an 
increasingly faster rate than the pace of social reconstruc-
tion, and thus another widening gap seems to exist. 
Nation building requires the emergence of a feeling 
for predictability in human relationships. The sense of 
predictability can widen a people's belief in the range of 
possible eventualities, and it can encourage them to raise 
their levels of collective ambitions. 
At the same time, this sense of predictability can 
be a reminder that social systems require a degree of social 
control and self-discipline which places restraints on all 
participants. Nation building calls for submission to newly 
imposed controls; and in the context of contemporary his-
tory, this requirement may appear to the individual who is 
unsure of his identity as a "foreign" demand that the self 
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be placed under new and alien "controls." The inherent 
requirements of the modern world--in all the realms of 
economics, education, urban life, and politics--may to 
transitional people seem provocative, threatening, and 
frustrating. 1 As long as there is confusion about essential 
forms of any evolving world order, there will be confusion 
about the appropriate standards of performance for an aspir-
ing nation-state. 
As stated before, the creation of a world union in-
volves not only the joining together of nation-states and the 
problems incurred with designating that status, but also the 
agreement of the nation-states so joined to give up degrees 
of their sovereignty in order to act as a collective unity. 
In the organization of the United Nations, it is the 
Security Council which, as far as coercive measures are con-
cerned, is empowered to discharge its "primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security." 
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the 
United Nation's Charter. 2 (To be sure, this maintenance 
applies only and solely to collective entities, that is. to 
states.) Any enforcement action by the Security Council re-
quires "an affirmative vote of seven members including the 
lIbid., p. 293. 
2F • B. Schlick. liThe Nuremberg Trial and the Inter-
national Law of the Future," American Journal of International 
Law. XLII (January, 1947). 772. 
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concurrent votes of the permanent members.,,1 It is obvious 
that such a decision presupposes agreement among the perma-
nent Members of the Security Council. Lack of agreement 
among the principal Powers entrusted with the task of taking 
joint action under appropriate circumstances will mean that 
lithe most important function of the Organization t the func-
tion which forms the core of the Charter, cannot be per-
formed. 112 
It appears that the United Nations was not effec-
tively constituted to act as an international police force. 
For it to be one, the nations of the world would have had to 
renounce their sovereign right to decide where their vital 
interests lay and to command their own armed forces. Further-
more, the veto system in the Security Council prevents any 
attempt to intervene if one of the great powers considers 
itself right and the others wrong. 
To perceive the United Nations organization as one 
possessing a peacekeeping fUnction is to confuse a theory 
with realityt To ascribe to the United Nations the role of 
arbiter in past conflicts as have developed in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Vietnam, the Pakistans, and the 
Middle East, is pure delusion. 
Therefore, inserting the provision against aggressive 
warfare in the Charter of the United Nations, while a noble 
2Ibidot p. 773. 
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ideal, appears to be unenforcable. This is primarily due to 
a lack of international consensus as to what determines the 
status and responsibilities of a nation-state member and to 
the absence of coercive power in the United Nations organiza-
tion. 
Chapter 5 
MODERN FORMS OF WARFAREs CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS 
The authors of the London Agreement had lived through 
World War II, which was conducted between nation-states. As 
representatives of victorious nations in that conflict, they 
created legal precedents that enabled an International 
Military Tribunal to label the vanquished nations guilty of 
aggressive warfare. They also witnessed the elevation of 
the principle of the illegality of aggressive warfare into a 
Charter that governed a world-wide organization. The out-
look for such an organization and the application of the 
incorporated principle were examined in Chapter 4. 
Many changes have developed in the relationships of 
countries since the London Conference of 1945. No longer is 
war or conflict primarily waged just between nation-states. 
Rather, in the recent past and in the near future. warfare 
may be categorized into two modern forms of armed conflictl 
a war between the superpowers, where macro-nuclear weapons 
could be used, and guerrilla wars, involving the modernizing 
nations. 
In the age of nuclear-deterrence strategy, it is 
expected that concepts and principles would develop between 
the participants (e.g., the superpowers) that would be re-
flected by their conduct in international activities. Prior 
to and immediately following World War II, nation-states 
were generally recognized as sovereign units. However, an 
examination today of actual practice with regard to the 
observance of sovereignty is wholly different I Small states 
located within the perimeter of a superpower's sphere of 
paramount interest may not exercise their sovereignty in a 
manner inimical to the interest of the superpower. 1 This 
umbrella position of superpower supremacy by both the Soviet 
Union and the United States has become known as the Brezhnev 
Doctrine and the Johnson Doctrine. These two doctrines 
express parallel assumptions regarding the superpower's 
conduct within their respective "zones of interest." The 
principles of the Brezhnev Doctrine are nearly indistinguish-
able from its counterpart, the Johnson Doctrine. 
An examination of the five points of both doctrines 
indicates their essential sameness. Briefly, the Brezhnev 
Doctrine's principles arel 
(1) A member nation of a regional or 
ideological community can never be withdrawn or 
withdraw itself from that community's jurisdiction. 
(2) The community may impose behavioral norms 
on its members in domestic and foreign policy- •• • 
(3) Whether a member of the community is ful-
filling these normative obligations is not deter-
mined by that member alone, but rather by the other 
members of the community. 
(4) If the other members determine that one 
IThomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, "The Johnson 
and Bre zhnev Doctrines." Stanford I .. a~Reyiew, XXII (April, 
1970). 979. 
member is derelict in its duties, they may use 
force to alter the policies and, if necessary, 
the government of the delinquent. Such use of 
force is not aggression but collective self-
defense •••• 
(5) Any socioeconomic or political doctrine 
of system differing from that of the community 
is ipso facto alien, and its espousal, even by citi-
zens and government of a member of the community, 
constitutes foreign sUbversion of and aggression 
against the community •••• 1 
And, briefly summarized. the Johnson Doctrine states. 
(1) A nation belonging to the American bloc 
cannot escape the jurisdiction of that bloc. 
(2) The bloc may impose its norms on member 
states. 
(3) It is the United states or its bloc which 
determines whether a state has complied with the 
established norms. 
(4) If the members of the bloc determine that 
a nation is derelict in its duty to abide by the 
norms established by the bloc, force may be used to 
secure such compliance; the use of force in such 
circumstances is not aggression but collective 
self-defense. 
(5) The expansion of an alien communist 
ideology into the American family will be toler-
ated only within limits which the family itself 
sets and which limits it may decide to i~pose with 
force on a deviating state in its midst. 
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The Brezhnev Doctrine was used to justify the 1956 invasion 
of Hungary by the Soviet Union and the 1968 liquidation of 
the Czech humanist-socialist experiment. Similarly, American 
intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala (1954) and 
Cuba (1962). and incursion into the Dominican Republic (1965), 
lIbido, pp. 986-87. 2Ibido, pp. 999-1004. 
reflected the rhetoric set forth in the Johnson Doctrine. 
The Brezhnev Doctrine contains a sixth point not 
found in the Johnson Doctrine. It states thatl 
(6) The territory of a member state may be in-
vaded by the armies of the other states acting 
collectively under the treaty of the community in 
response to a summons by any persons the community 
designates as loyalist "leaders" of the invaded 
state, even though these are not recognized as the 
legal government of that ~tate even by the other 
members of the community. 
The use of military invasion did not enter into the United 
States' coercive attempt to compel adherence to bloc norms 
in the confrontation with Cuba and Guatemala; however, 
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President Johnson did not show the same restraint during the 
crisis over the Dominican Republic. 
The Johnson and Brezhnev doctrines have no relation 
whatever to the global legal order proclaimed at Nuremberg 
or in the Charter of the United Nations. Both the Soviet 
Union and the United States claim and exercise the right 
to exclude the system and machinations of the other from 
their zones of vital interest, and what they decide may be 
far removed from what the people of the country involved 
might choose. 
It seems clear that despite the oratory about the 
indivisibility of peace, authority remains in the capitals 
of the superpowers, and what is left of global collective 
security is the right of regional allies to agree to go along 
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with determinations made in Washington and Moscow. 
Much has been made of the "nuclear stalemate" which 
has come about with the development by the United States and 
the Soviet Union of thermonuclear offensive and defensive 
weapons systems. Only two decades ago, this was considered 
a difficult and delicate engineering feat, but now nuclear 
weapons have become plentiful. Moreover, there is no secret 
now about the manufacture of nuclear weapons or even of 
thermonuclear devices. Given a certain level of technology, 
any industrialized states will be able to, and have, pro-
duced them. During the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, John 
F. Kennedy said that we live under the Sword of Damocles of 
nuclear weapons- Hidden from view and/or carried in sub-
marines and planes, "every schoolboy knowstl that these 
weapons, if used, mean the annihilation of attacker and 
attacked, and millions of others around the world. 1 
Since achievement of apparent detente with the Soviet 
Union, the probability of war may seem further away than it 
was in 1962. However, Secretary of state Henry Kissinger 
recently commented on the non-stability of the international 
system. He saids 
lWilliam A. Nesbitt and Oharles Bloomstein, "Should 
the Nation-State Give Way to Some Form of World Organiza-
tion?" Controversial Issues in the Social Studiesl A 
Contemporary Perspective, ed. R. H. Muessig (Washington, 
National CouncIl for the Social Studies, 1975), p. 262. 
I do not want to speculate what the United 
Sta~es.would do if it should appear that instead of 
beglnnlng an era of cooperation we were thrown 
back to the confrontations which sooner or later 
will have to be surmounted, because humanity cannot 
stand the eternal conflicts of thos e who have the 
capacity to destroy.l 
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Throughout history, hUmanity has suffered. from a 
shortage of power and has made concerted efforts to develop 
new sources and special applications of it. It would have 
seemed unbelievable fifty years ago that there would ever be 
an excess of power and that man's survival would depend on 
the ability to use it subtly and with discrimination. Yet, 
this is precisely the challenge of the nuclear age. Since 
the end of World War II brought us not peace but an uneasy 
armistice, we have responded to what can best be described 
as a flight into technologya devising ever more fearful 
weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however. the greater 
becomes the reluctance to use them. 
It is natural that an age which has known two world 
wars should have as its central problem the attainment of 
peace. It is paradoxical, however, that so much hope should 
be concentrated on man's most destructive capabilities. We 
are told that the growth of the thermonuclear stockpiles has 
created a stalemate which makes war, if not too risky. at 
least unprofitable. The power of the new weapons technology 
is said to have brought about a tacit nonaggression treaty: 
lNew York Times, October 26, 1973, p. 18, col. 5· 
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a recognition that war is no longer a conceivable instrument 
of policy and that, for this reason. international disputes 
can be settled only by means of diplomacy. And it has been 
maintained that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy have 
made irrelevant many of the traditional motivations for wars 
of aggression because each major power can bring about a 
tremendous increase in its productive capacity without 
annexing either foreign territory or foreign labor. 
According to Henry A. Kissinger, these assertions fit 
well with a national psychology which considers peace as the 
"normal" pattern of relations among states and which has few 
doubts that reasonable men can settle all differences by 
honest compromise. So much depends, however. on the cor-
rectness of such propositions that they must be subjected to 
close scrutiny. Kissinger maintains that, 
• • • if recourse to force has in fact become 
impossible, diplomacy too may lose its efficacy. 
Far from leading to a resolution of tensions, the 
inability to use force may perpetuate all disputes, 
however trivial. It may be a strange fulfillment 
of the hopes for centuries for universal peace that, 
when finally realized, it should contribute to the 
demoralization of the international order, and that 
diplomacy, so long considered the alternative to 
war, should emerge as its complement. 1 
And, he continues. 
The motive force behind international settlements 
has always been a combination of the belief in the 
advantages of harmony and the fear of the conse-
quenses of proving obdurate. A renunciation of 
lHenry A. Kissinger, ~ucl~§f-Weapons and Foreign 
Pot!.9..Y. (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 4. 
force, b¥ eliminating the penalty for intransi-
gence, w111 therefore place the international 
order at the mercy of its most ruthless or its 
most irresponsible member. 1 
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If a nuclear war were to erupt, all other problems 
would be meaningless. Obviously, in considering the future 
of the nation-state, no problem is of greater significance; 
indeed, the issue of war and peace has been the principal 
impetus for those who would radically change the nation-
state system in favor of some other kind of world structure. 
Simply stated, the notion that a just war of defense 
is fought against an aggressor helps make a moral case and 
stiffen the military posture. But what the Soviet repre-
sentative at the London Conference, General Nikitchenko, 
said of aggression remains truer "Although when people speak 
of it they know what they mean; but they cannot define it.,,2 
It remains undefined and undefinable. 
If they had happened immediately following the London 
Conference, the military invasions of Czechoslovakia and the 
Dominican Republic might well have been viewed internation-
ally as wars of aggression. But now, due to a regional 
alignment of the superpowers, the invasions have been 
2International Conference on Military Trials, London, 
Report.ofRobert H. Jackson UniteS ~tates R~presentativ~ to 
the International Conference on M111tary Tr1als, U. S. Dept. 
of State Publication 3080 (Washington, D.C.I U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1949), p. 328. 
J 
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acquiesced to. if not condoned, by the other nation-states-
Regionalism today means that, 
Collective self-defense permits a superpower 
to intervene in the internal affairs of its 
neighbors to prevent the establishment of a 
regime inspired by an ideology or e. regime con-
sidered hostile by the superpower. 1 
Although the London Conference declared aggressive warfare 
to be illegal. a superpower cannot commit "aggressive war-
fare" within its own region. Rather, it is now labeled 
"collective self-defense." Furthermore. the practice by 
the superpowers of arbitrarily employing coercive measures 
against one of their regional members ignores a provision of 
the United Nations Charter. Article 53 declaresl "No 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrange-
ments without the authority of the Security Council_" 2 
lFranck and Weisband, p. 1011. 
-Chapter 6 
MODERN FORMS OF WARFARE. GUERRILLA WAR 
Guerrilla or partisan warfare, the dominant form of 
hostility since World War II, has been developed and modified 
for postwar contingencies 0 It is a form of war well adapted 
to the nuclear age and its military stalemate, and for cen-
turies has been fought with marked success by small nations 
against great powers. 
Partisan warfare has been a vital weapon in the cru-
sade preached by Communist China against the Western powers 
on behalf of the poor people of the countryside in their re-
volt against the rich and decadent Western cities; and in 
the rhetoric of American Negro militants, it is the war of 
the revolutionaries of the urban poor against their oppres-
sors. Partisan warfare. with its hit-and-run tactics, has 
also played an important part in the majority of battles in 
wars of national liberation. The Israelis used it to help 
speed the British out of Palestine, and local populations of 
North Africa and Indochina to drive out the French. In addi-
tion, guerrilla warfare was the main weapon of Castro in his 
Cuban revolution; and Mao Tse-tung, one of its chief 
prophets, based his campaigns against both Chiang and the 
Japanese on guerrilla tactics and strategy. 
In much of the traditional literature of comparative 
politics, the assumption is presented that the world is 
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compartmentalized into a Western and a non-Western segment, 
and, inevitably, will split into communist and non-communist 
parts. However, in more recent literature and studies, some 
political scientists view the world in terms of the political 
consequences of modernization. stressing the common tradi-
tional background of all countries, with no special refer-
ence to communism any more than any other particular ide-
ology or movement. It will be in this latter framework that 
the following discussion will be placed. the consideration 
of a broad phenomenon, peasant-based guerrilla warfare, led 
by modernizers as a present-day companion form of armed con-
flict, along with nuclear warfare. (Modernizers are defined 
as "persons who have accepted the assumption that industri-
alization must occur. lI )l 
Most peasants in underdeveloped countries remain 
politically passive. Their age-old tradition of nonpartici-
pation in politics beyond the village level tends to keep 
them quiescent. However, peasant movements do flare up and 
die down, but more often than not, these are chiefly expres-
sions of resentment against modernization. The inclinations 
which underlie them aim at a restoration of the traditional 
peasant society. 
Ordinarily. the modernizers look for and receive 
l John Kautsky, The P.olitic~1.~.onsequences of Moderni-
zatiQ!} (New York: John Wiley, 1972), p. 17· 
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their mass support primarily in the cities among the newly-
created industrial workers. But where modernizers find few 
or no workers in the cities. or especially when modernizers 
have failed in their revolutionizing efforts there, they 
turn to the countryside in their search of mass support. 
Modernizers cannot hope to stir the peasantry with 
their promises of rapid industrialization, which is meaning-
less to peasants, or probably even with vistas of independ-
ence, since peasants generally have little direct contact 
with colonialism and do not link their own troubles with it. 
The one major issue around which peasants can be mobilized 
is that of land reform, a term that now not only has anti-
aristocratic implications, but also suggests opposition to 
the money lender, the merchant, and the commercial landlord. 1 
Even promises of land reform are by no means always success-
ful in stirring the peasantry out of its political passivity. 
Still, in a few countries like China, Algeria, Cuba, and 
Vietnam, modernizers have been able to mobilize peasant sup-
port to make their revolution. Sometimes, as in China and 
Russia, the support has been in great numbers and, conversely, 
sometimes the support has involved only a few peasants (or 
plantation workers), as in Cuba. Land reform has generally 
been a key issue in these efforts, but where peasants suf-
fered directly from colonialism or foreign occupation, as 
they did in China under the Japanese, in Algeria where the 
--------------------......... .......... 
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large landlords were French, on American-owned plantations 
in Cuba, and, perhaps, in Israeli-occupied Arab territories, 
they could also be mobilized by appeals for independence and 
what has come to be known as wars of national liberation. 
While urban (specifically, worker) support can be 
used by modernizers to bring about peaceful change, mass 
peasant support is employed primarily in the form of war-
fare. l Unlike workers, peasants cannot effectively strike 
or demonstrate in city streets. In societies where numbers 
do not count, where there are no elections and no mass inter-
est group organizations, the only effective form of political 
participation open to the peasant beyond the village level 
is violence. 
The involvement of peasants in the movement of the 
modernizers, then. tends to result in warfare. and the 
peculiar form of peasant warfare is guerrilla warfare. 2 The 
manpower is provided by the peasantry. made available by the 
underemployment in villages subject to the impact of some 
modernization. The peasants' subsistence economy simpli-
fies the problem of supplying the guerrillas. The poor 
systems of communications prevailing in rural areas put 
modern military forces at a disadvantage as against the 
guerrillas and make it difficult for the former to keep open 
the supply lines of the cities. 
--------------------............ ........ 
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It appears, then, that once peasants have been 
mobilized and organized by modernizers to carryon guerrilla 
warfare, they cannot be defeated militarily.1 So-called 
civic action efforts by the government to win over the 
peasantry, for example, by providing schools or health care 
for the villagers, are likely to fall short of success. 
Peasants mayor may not appreciate these, but in any case, 
what they want far more is lana reform. 
The victories of modernizers leading guerrilla armies 
have resulted generally from the inability or unwillingness 
of aristocratic and colonial governments to keep fighting 
an extremely persistent enemy. With two undefeatable forces 
facing each other, the peasants are likely to win, perhaps 
simply because they have no place to withdraw to for they 
are fighting at home. 2 Foreign colonial forces do have the 
alternative of withdrawal available to them, and so do at 
least the top elements of the native aristocracy and their 
representatives. Once modernizers have successfully initi-
ated guerrilla warfare, they will probably eventually march 
to victory at the heads of their peasant armies. 
Thus far in this discussion, an attempt has been made 
to look at guerrilla warfare as a generalized phenomena, 
devoid of any particular ideology or symbols. It may be of 
value, however. to consider briefly the uniqueness of 
lIbid., p. 124. 
communism, for it does have specific features. These 
features go back to the communists' Marxian symbols, which 
once distinguished them more sharply than they do now from 
movements of noncommunist modernizers. 1 
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Because of their Marxian heritage, communist parties 
are more inclined than other movements of modernizers to 
stress the class divisions of societies, and they have, in 
fact, like all of these movements, sought support from 
members of all classes. The problem of intellectuals pre-
dominating in parties wedded to the Marxian symbols of pro-
letarianism was resolved verbally from Lenin's time on by the 
claim that these intellectuals represented proletarian class 
consciousness and thus no matter what policies they pur-
sued were by definition proletarian. John Kautsky goes on 
further to state that, 
• • • beginning in the late 1940s--and in the 
case of Mao, with his bloc of four classes, even 
a few years earlier--communists have been appealing 
not only to intellectuals as well as the lI expl oited 
masses" of the workers, the peasants, and the 
"petty bourgeoisis" ••• t but also, quite expli-
citly, to the bourgeoisie and even to sOI?e of the 
aristocracy. They could do so by replac7ng . 
capitalism. the enemy of Marx's proletarlat ln 
industrial societies. with imperialism or 
colonialism. the enemy of the modernizers' move-
ments, and, thereby, in effect giving ~p t~e 
proletarian class struggle and revolutlon. 
Whether Kautsky's conclusion about the change in the com-
munists' perception of the classes they represent and the 
--------------------............... .... 
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enemies they fight is valid or not is left open to question. 
It is clear, however, that the theme heard in the public 
expression of communist rhetoric would not parallel his 
conclusion. 
Lenin called colonialism an absolute evil, a view 
shared by most African and Asian countries, and communist 
doctrine in both China and the Soviet Union holds that any 
state possessing colonies is already convicted of criminal-
ity and aggression_ Subject peoples, according to the com-
munists, have a right to take armed action to redress old 
crimes committed against them, as well as to undertake 
reprisals, and to use any means at their disposal to recover 
their independence. 1 Every war of national liberation is, 
therefore, a legitimate response to the built-in provocation 
of an existing colonial power. 
According to current communist thought, guerrilla 
warfare is part of the worldwide struggle against capitalism 
and imperialism, that is, against the imperialism of the 
Western powers or, as one observer has remarked, against 
imperialism that crosses water. (This, of course, also 
refers back to the concept of regionalism discussed in 
Chapter 5.) Imperialism by way of land routes, if conducted 
as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia on behalf of the socialist 
1Eugene Davidson, The Nuremberg Fal1~cy (New York, 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 18. 
order of peaceloving nations, is, of course, legitimate in 
the communist view. (Again, the Johnson Doctrine would 
proclaim the same legitimacy regarding the Western Hemi-
sphere.) Khrushchev wrote. 
The Socialist countries and the Communist 
parties allover the world will continue to aid 
and support the peoples who are waging an armed 
struggle against capitalism. Far from contra-
dicting the principle of peaceful coexistence, 
this is an affirmation of that concept since the 
issue at stake • • • is the right of all people 
to order their lives as they see fit, to be 
masters in their own house. 1 
Also, from the communist point of view, 
• . • the struggle of people against reac-
tionary regimes cannot be destroyed by inter-
national agreement. For this struggle to cease, 
the causes eliciting it must b~ eliminated, i.e., 
capitalism must be liquidated. 
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By definition, no war resorted to by a socialist state con-
stitutes an aggression, and no war fought by a capitalist 
state can be anything but imperialistic. A socialist war is 
always a just war, and those who fight on the other side are 
criminals. In the communist construal, the North Vietnamese, 
for example, can legitimately deny captured American airmen 
treatment as prisoners of war. 
The communists believe that capitalism is aggression 
lGeorge Ginsburgs. "Viars of National Liberation and 
the Modern Law of Nations--The Soviet Thesis," Law and Con-
temQQrary Problems, XXIX (Autumn 1964). 939· 
2Robert D. Crane, "Basic Principles in Soviet Space 
Law " Law and ContemJ2QrarY_~roQ.lem§.. XXIX (Autumn 1964), 944. 
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and exploitation, and the struggle against it is justified 
wherever and whenever it occurs. The Havana Conference of 
January, 1966, called on the peoples of all countries to 
support national liberation movements and to undertake sub-
versive action to overturn the governments of a number of 
members of the Organization of American States.! With the 
United Nations now dominated numerically by the Afro-Asian 
bloc, plus the representatives of the communist bloc, this 
is also the view of the United Nations. In its Declaration 
of January, 1960, HOn Granting Independence to Colonial 
Peoples,1f the United Nations Assembly declared that every 
nation has the right to self-determination and that: 
The SUbjugation of peoples is contrary to the 
Charter and World Peace ••• the inadequacy of 
political or social or educational preparation 
should never serve as a pretext to delay independ-
ence. All ~rmed efforts against such attempts 
must cease. 
'This doctrine applies to all the emerging nations t as well as 
to countries with native populations that are not in power. 
To generalize at this point, guerrilla warfare as an 
alternative or companion to nuclear warfare is a reality in 
our time. Furthermore, it has been legitimized by the 
United Nations, now and in the future, and national 
lDavidson, p. 19. 
2GinsbUr~s, np .• 940-41-
'-.> .... 
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independence achieved by such a process must be recognized. 
The problem. then, is thisl How can the principles 
instituted at the 1945 London Conference that made illegal 
the waging of aggressive war and the resulting crimes against 
humanity be applied to guerrilla warfare? 
It is nearly impossible today to brand a state guilty 
of waging aggressive warfare if the state maintains its 
action is for the purpose of self-determination. The charge 
that crimes against humanity were committed as a result of 
the waging of war becomes highly irrelevant. Guerrilla wars 
have never been fought according to conventions, for by their 
nature they involve the use of mass terror. Guerrilla war 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries presented the 
same dilemma as it does in its contemporary forms, and the 
impulse to meet savagery on its own terms was as powerful 
then as it is now. 
Chapter 7 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW CONTAINED IN THE LONDON CHARTER 
The process of Political integration and change has 
been and is a continuing world-wide phenomenon. At the 
London Conference, an unstated philosophy behind the attempt 
to outlaw war was to freeze the status guo, thereby denying 
the existence of world-wide political change. 1 
Radhabinod Pal of India, a member of the International 
Law Association, was one of the eleven justices at the 1946 
Tokyo trials for Japanese war criminals. In his dissenting 
opinion of the Tokyo Tribunal's :,judgment, he vehemently ob-
jected to the Tribunal's assumption of the status guo. 
Although Pal was not a participant in the London Conference 
or the Nuremberg trials, his comments are applicable to them. 
Pal wrote: 
I am not sure if it is possible to create "peace" 
once for all, and if there can be status guo which 
is to be eternal. At any rate in the present state 
of international relations such a static idea of 
peace is absolutely untenable. Certainly dominated 
nations of the present day status fl!!Q. cannot be 
made to submit to eternal domination only in the 
name of peace. International law must be prepared 
to face the problem of bringing within juridical 
l The policy of the status guo aims at the maintenance 
of the distribution of power as it exists at a particular 
moment in history. In this discussion the point of reference 
is the period immediately following World War II. This usage 
differs from Morgenthaurs ana~sis of status guo which im-
plies status guo ~ bellum Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nation§, (New York, Knopf, 19 7). p. ij}. 
limits the politico-historical evolution of man-
kind which up to now has been accomplished chiefly 
through war. War and other methods of self-help 
by. force can 'l?e effectively excluded only when 
th1S prob~em 1S ~olvedt and it is only then that 
we can th1nk of 1ntroducing criminal responsibil-
ity for efforts at adjustment by means other than 
peaceful. 
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It was impossible to outlaw war without considering the merits 
of freezing the status guo, and yet, at London and Tokyo no 
one proposed taking that step. 
Emphasizing the reality of world-wide change, Henry 
Kissinger labels the period since World War II a revolution-
ary period. He sees this period as a particular problem 
because: 
• • • the distinguishing feature of revolution 
is the priority it gives to change over the re-
quirement of harmony. Contemporary international 
relations would therefore be difficult at best. 
but they take on a special urgency because never 
have so ma2Y different revolutions occurred simul-
taneously. 
On the political plane, the postwar period has seen the 
emergence into nationhood of a large number of peoples 
hitherto under colonial rule. To integrate so many new 
states into the international community would not be a simple 
matter at any time; it has become increasingly formidable 
because many of the newly-independent states continue to in-
ject into their policies the revolutionary fervor that gained 
lRichard H. Minear, Victors· Justlc~ (Princetonl 
Princeton University Press. 1971}. p. 60. 
2Henry A. Kissinger. Nuclear.WeaQons.and Foreign 
Poli~ (New Yorks Harper and Brothers. 1957), p. 5· 
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them independence. 
On the ideological plane. the contemporary ferment is 
fed by the rapidity with which ideas can be communicated and 
by the inherent impossibility of fulfilling the expectations 
aroused by revolutionary slogans. On the economic and 
social plane, millions are rebelling against standards of 
living as well as against social and racial barriers which 
have remained unchanged for centuries. 
War, regardless of its form. is indeed reprehensible 
and primitive, and may threaten universal catastrophe. But 
it cannot be conjured away by calling it the crime of an 
individual,. or individuals. to be suppressed by a world 
community of "peace-loving" nations, when to responsible 
leaders it always appears as a final recourse against intol-
erable injury or national disaster. (Most peace treaties 
are concluded under duress. But duress does not make a 
treaty void or voidable in international law.) Under 
present or past world conditions. the attempt to adopt a 
universal status guo posture is highly unrealistic. 
The assumption that the world society is one char-
acterized by change. rather than by stability, severely 
limits the principle and application of the illegality of 
aggressive warfare. This assumption and ensuing limitation 
suggests the question of whether there are alternatives to 
the present international system of nation-states, and, if 
so, what institutional arrangements are not only desirable 
.. 
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but feasible. Four possible alternatives will be briefly 
examined; (1) all-purpose world government, (2) limited 
world government, (3) regional institutions, and (4) func-
tional government. (None of these forms are absolute; vari-
ations of each plan could also be introduced.) 
In an all-purpose world government, sovereign power 
would be transferred from the nation-states to a larger or 
higher unit. In addition to its function of providing 
security, the world government would also be responsible for 
global general welfare--guaranteeing protection against the 
worst natural and social calamities, promoting economic de-
velopment. and providing for health and education. Clearly, 
an all-purpose world government could be a bureaucratic maze, 
and financing would be extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble. Furthermore, a problem might develop in resolving how 
the monopoly of power in the central authority would be 
determined and exercised. Another potential problem might 
be that the dominant group--whether the most affluent or 
least affluent. or simply the group larger in number than 
the other--could become a tyranny against the rest. 
Norman Cousins argues that we must establish a 
central authority ilwhich takes away from nations, summarily 
and completely, not only the machinery of battle that can 
wage war, but the machinery of decision that can start a 
- ==~~--------........... .. 
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war. lll 
Others seemingly no less desirous of peace and no 
less aware of the perils of the present international system 
of nation-states disagree. Questioning the value of a single 
world system Harvard's Karl Deutsch saysl 
A world government that had all control in one 
centralized place for decision making about the 
enforcement of law would have control over the law t 
much as the Roman Legions had control over the Roman 
Empire. Once such a government controlled all laws, 
it would be able to control all aspects of life. 2 
Maurice Strong. principal organizer of the Stockholm Confer-
ence of 1972 and a leader of the United Nations Environment 
Program, doubts that one-world government will become a 
reality. Recently. he wrote I 
The development of new international machinery 
to deal with the complex problems of an increasing-
ly interdependent technological civilization will 
not come about through the surrender of sovereignty 
by national governments but only by the purposeful 
exercise of the sovereignty •••• The world is 
not likely to unite behind a common ideology or a 
super-government.) 
A second alternative to the present system of 
lWilliam A. Nesbitt and Charles Bloomstein, "ShoUld 
the Nation-State Give Way to Some Form of World Organization?!! 
Controversial Issues in the Social Studies; A Contero ora 
Persyective. ed.R. H. Muessig Washington: National Council 
for the Social Studies. 1975), p. 262. 
JMaurice Strong. IIOne Yea.r After ?tockhol~1 An 
Ecological Approach to Management. II Forel.gn Affa~rs, LI 
(JUly. 1973), 706. 
..... 
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sovereign states is limited world government, a situation 
where the nation-states maintain their identity and structures 
but voluntarily surrender certain limited and specified 
powers to an over-arching body, i.e., world federalism. The 
key question here would bel Would nation-states ever re-
linquish their armed forces to a central authority. when 
national decision-makers associate their role and status with 
military power'? Considering our present United Nations and 
the small degree of coercive power afforded to it by the 
member-nations, coupled with the difficulty of defining a 
nation-state and its responsibilities internationally, the 
answer is in the negative. 
It has been projected that regional organizations. 
such as the European Common Market, could become a stepping 
stone to world organization. However. there is doubt that 
the creation of a strong regional organization among once 
competing nation-states will move the world closer to peace. 
Such a unit may become simply another power bloc. competing 
with existing power blocs and tending to become exclusive of 
non-members in the competition for world resources and 
markets. 
A different type of regional alignment based on 
nuclear strength (discussed in Chapter 5) is also evident 
today. If sanctions are not applied. such regional alli-
ances fUnction collectively only when they are perceived to 




Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, collective action may 
not develop if the regional group members do not perceive 
their state to be imperiled, as evidenced by the action of 
the members of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty 
Organization in the Vietnam conflict. 1 These regional 
groupings are not much different from the former system of 
alliances prevailing prior to World Wars I and II, consti-
tuting again a rough balance of power. These regional align-
ments maYt over time, encourage conflict rather than promote 
peace. 
A fourth alternative to the current international sys-
tem of nation-states is functionalism. 2 The functional 
approach takes the position that viable and legitimate trans-
national institutions result from a process during which 
limited and specific tasks are assigned to limited and 
specific organizations to meet particular problems. Maurice 
Strong asserts: 
It is only when nations find themselves incap-
able of exercising their sovereignty effectively 
or advantageously on a unilateral.bas~s that th~y 
will agree--reluctantly--to exerS1se 1t collect1vely 
by agreement with other nations. 
lEugene Davidson, The Nuremberg Fallacy (New Yorkl 
Macmillan, 1973), p. 292. 
2Inis L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares (New York: 
Random House. 1971), p. 378. 
3Strong. p. 706. 
-The functional approach would avoid forcing a choice of 
alternatives. ranging from the continuation of the present 
nation-state system to the potential creation of world 
government. 
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Rather, it would ask what needs to be done to solve 
problems not amenable to national solutions, since the 
problems do not respect national boundaries. Energy short-
ages, resource depletion. over-population. food shortages, 
and environmental deterioration all affect each other; and 
all in their combined impact have potentially dangerous 
implications for keeping conflict within tolerable bounds as 
we face the twenty-first century. The key concept is inter-
dependence. As our biosphere is a single environmental sys-
tern, so are we part of a world-wide economic system. Present 
conflicts may be worsened by competition for new sources of 
raw materials--the seabed tomorrow, the moon in due course. 
The nation-state is not structured to cope with these 
newly-perceived difficulties, and may give way to an increas-
ingly complex system of international cooperative groups such 
as the specialized agencies of the United Nations; non-
governmental groups. e.g., the World Federation of Trade 
Unions and the International Chamber of Commerce I and possi-
bly, interchange between or integration of world-wide busi-
t . 1 ness corpora ~ons. 
lClaUde, p. 382. 
... 
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Throughout this chapter. the consideration of various 
alternatives to present-day international governmental organ-
izations was primarily motivated to ascertain if there is a 
potential form of world-wide alignment that could effect the 
principle of the illegality of aggressive warfare as set 
forth at the London Conference. Over time it may develop 
that the overriding imperative to deal with these global 
social, economic and environmental problems may provide the 
key to reordering the nation-state system and, as a con-
sequence rather than a declared goal. end aggressive warfare. 
There is a choice to be made between the status quo--
in which the strongest nation-states retain the sovereign 
power to wreak annihilating damage upon each other and seri-
ously disrupt life elsewhere; in which any disorder of insta-
bility in the Third World threatens to involve the nuclear 
powers; in which an interdependent world faces an array of 
interrelated problems, including competition for Bcarce 
resources--and some alternative. 
But while the imperatives of world society and the 
functional needs of states require a new definition of 
sovereignty. there is no denying that the nation-state is 
still the actor on the world scene. Governments remain in 
control of what has been a fundamental aspect of sovereignty: 
the power to make peace and war. 
Therefore. from a pragmatic stance an understanding 
of why nation-states and, in particular. aspiring nation-states 
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behave as they do. rather than how they are expected to 
perform, is essential. Since the mid-1950s, this fundamental 
change of approach has been reflected in the scope and 
direction of comparative political analysis. As late as 
1944, leading scholars of political science referred to com-
parative government as "a discipline in a status of sus-
pended animationo ll1 The roots of reaction to formal-
legalism in American political science can be traced back 
to the 1920s and 1930s and to the "pioneering writings of 
scholars such as George E. G. Catlin. Charles R. Merriam, 
and Harold Lasswell 0.,2 Today. rather than emphasizing the 
traditional approach to the study of comparative politics. 
political scholars have begun to focus seriously and sys-
tematically upon the problems of political development and 
social change. Furthermore, the methodologies, theoretical 
frameworks, and conceptual apparatus pertinent to compara-
tive analysis are now neither monopolized by nor concen-
trated within the discipline of political science. In this 
spirit. "leading scholars such as David Singer and David 
Easton have already called for the establishment of a 
. . t' t ... 3 
'Federation of Soc~al Sc~en ~s s. 
l J . A. Bill and R. Hardgrave, Jr., Compar~tive 
.POlitics I The Quest for Theor~ (Columbusl Merr~ll. 1973), 
p. 10. 
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Today we have available many studies--cross-national 
comparisons or analyses of particular political systems--
that may increase our understanding and prediction of the 
political process. Works such as David Easton's A Frame~ 
for Political Analysis (1965), Lucian Pye's Aspects of 
Political DeveloBment (1966), and Robert Dahl's Politics. 
Economics and Welfare (1953) t have given us insight into 
areas such as the persistence of political systems over 
long periods of time, the characteristics of political cul-
ture and development in non-Western societies, and the 
realization by calCUlation and control of rational social 
action. 
One common characteristic shared by these and other 
political scientists is that theories have not developed 
from their analytical works. The ability to control remains 
a potential goal. but the expanding research in comparative 
politics may enable us to explain and predict events that 
may, as a result. aid in reducing international conflict. 
To summarize, the London Conference was held following 
World War II to establish the law and procedures for the 
Nuremberg war-crime trials. The Conference was comprised of 
representatives of the four major victorious nationSl France, 
Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. A 
major difficulty encountered in establishing the procedures 
was combining the divergencies of the Continental and Anglo-
American systems of law. A second and equally major problem 
> 
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that arose was one of substantive process. Was aggressive 
war viewed internationally as a crime? Those that affirmed 
that it was proclaimed that the Conference was only codifying 
what was generally accepted as a principle of international 
law. Others, however, viewed the establishment at London of 
the illegality of aggressive warfare as ~ post facto legis-
lation. 
Once the principle of outlawing aggressive war was 
established, the question arose: How will this principle be 
put into effect? Consideration has been given to the situa-
tion that today world organization is based on the nation-
state concept, with weak coercive powers awarded to the 
United Nations. The lack of international consensus as to 
what constitutes a nation-state and its responsibilities to 
the central organization. coupled with the lack of coercive 
power given to the United Nations, make difficult. if not 
impossible, the enforcement of the provision against aggres-
sive warfare. Tied closely to this problem of effecting the 
outlawing of aggressive war within a nation-state structure 
are the current forms of warfare; nuclear warfare and guer-
rilla warfare. The nuclear stalemate has resulted in a 
regional alignment between the Soviet Union and the United 
States as expressed in the Brezhnev and Johnson Doctrines. 
The rationale of these doctrines makes an a.ct of aggression 
by either of the superpowers within their respective zones 
of interest impossible to curb, since small states may not 
> 
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exercise their sovereignty in a manner inimical to the 
interest of the superpower. Guerrilla warfare is a type of 
warfare commonly used by emerging nations to achieve their 
independence. Regardless of the savagery of the conflict. 
this form of warfare has been legitimized by the United 
Na tiona if the participants claim their goal is national 
liberation. Therefore, today the principle of outlawing 
warfare is not applied against superpowers acting within 
their spheres of paramount interest or groups engaging in 
guerrilla warfare as a means to achieving self-determination. 
Lastly, an examination has been made of alternatives 
to the present international system of nation-states as 
potential vehicles through which the principle of outlawing 
aggressive warfare could be enforced. 
In the final consideration of the London Conference 
and the resulting Charter, two major questions will be con-
sidereda From a narrow perspective, did the Conference act 
wi thin the accepted norms of international law in their 
procedural and substantive decisions I and, in a broader per-
spective, is collective security as now constituted able to 
enforce the principle of outlawing aggressive warfare? 
The amalgamation of two systems of law, The Conti-
nental and the Anglo-American. makes it difficult to judge, 
from a necessarily biased viewpoint. the II fairness" of the 
prescribed rules of the trial procedure. The innovative 
establishment of an International Military Tribunal. in the 
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absence of existing international precedents. also makes an 
objective assessment difficult. However. the acquiescence 
to relaxing the traditional (i. e. I traditional to the Anglo-
American system) rules of evidence: the absence of a non-
partial jury for consideration of the verdicts; the 
establishment of a panel of four judges. none of whom could 
be considered "impartial" in any rational understanding of the 
term; and, above all, an unprecedented "international" trial 
of the vanquished by the victors. would lead this author to 
have serious doubts that under these conditions accused per-
sons could receive due process of law. 
A decision made at the London Conference was that 
conspiring to or waging aggressive war was an international 
crime and that the conferees were only codifying a principle 
that was and had been generally accepted internationally. 
Many scholars of international law contend against 
this rationalization. Their position is that in fact no 
such consensus existed. and. in effect. ~ post facto legis-
lation was created. This author would tend to agree with 
their position. 
If, indeed, conspiring to or waging aggressive war-
fare is a principle of international law, the question re-
mains: Can this principle be effectively applied today? 
To assess the answer to this question. an overall 
jUdgment of contemporary international realities must be 
made. Consideration must be given to the facts thatl the 
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United Nations has been awarded weak coercive powers; the 
superpowers are regionally aligned and have established the 
practice of "collective self-defense" within their respective 
regions; any consensual definition of a nation-state is 
lacking, especially with regard to emerging nations; and, 
the nation-states or aspiring nation-states have the uni-
versally confirmed right to engage in wars of self-
determination. 
The conclusion of this author is that. based on the 
above considerations, the principle of outlawing aggressive 
warfare developed at the London Conference cannot be effec-
tively applied today. 
EPILOGUE 
On April 12. 1974, a definition of aggre.ssion, a 
matter first taken up by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations twenty-four years ago. was approved by consensus at 
the end of a five-week session of the Special Committee on 
the Question of Defining Aggression. 1 This latest effort to 
define aggression, the result of seven years of work by a 
thirty-five member body, was accepted and approved in 
September, 1974, by the United Nations Genera.l Assembly.2 
Since the first effort to define aggression in the 
Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference in 1927. 
there have been many attempts at definition and few results. 
Notable milestones in this effort are the Pacts of 1933 
executed by the U.S.S.R. with neighbors to define aggres-
sion, the provisions of the 1945 Charter for the Nuremberg 
trials, a discussion in the International Law Commission in 
1951. and the deliberations of earlier "Special Committees ll 
in 1953, 1956 and 1959. 3 
In an explanatory note attached to the draft defini-
tion, the sponsors declared that the term "'State' is used 
lllQuestion of Defining Aggression," United Nations 
Monthly Chronicle, XI, No.5 (1974), 86. 
2Ibid • 
J John N. Hazard, "Why Try Again to Define Aggression, It 
American Journal of International Law. LXII (July, 1968), 702. 
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without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether 
a state is a Member of the United Nations. n and that the 
expression II 'any weapons· is used without making a distinc-
tion between conventional weapons, weapons of mass destruc-
tion and any other kind of weapon. t,l 
In Article J of the definition any of the following 
acts would qualify as an act of aggression. 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of 
a State of the territory of another State, or any 
military occupation, however temporary, resulting 
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by 
the use of force of the terri tory of another State 
or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State 
against the territory of another State or the use 
of any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a 
State by the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State 
on the land, sea or air forces, marine and air fleets 
of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State, which 
are within the territory of another state with the 
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention 
of the conditions provided for in the agreem~nt or 
any extension of their presence in such terr1tory 
beyond the termination of the agreement: 
(f) The action of a State in allowin~ its 
territory, which it has placed at the d1sposal of 
another State, to be used by that oth~r State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression aga1nst a thlrd 
State; 
l/1Question of Defining Aggression," op • cit .• pp. 
86-87. 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands t groups, irregulars or mercenaries 
which carry out acts of armed force against an~ther 
State of such gravity as to amou.nt to the acts 
liste~ a£ove. or its substantial involvement 
there~n. 
In A.rticle 4 it was further stated that. 
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive 
and the Security Council may determine that other 
acts constit~te aggression under the provision of 
the Charter .. 
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A t the London Conference aggressive warfare was out-
lawed and thirty years later the United Nations defined 
aggression. However, the period following World War II has 
been one filled with armed conflicts, police actions and 
wars of national liberation. International legislation--
that is, the process of establishing rules by consent--can 
only be effected if the essential interests of the nation-
states coincide. In the opinion of this author no such 
harmony of interest exists and, furthermore, the United 
Nations as now constituted lacks the power to enforce its 
prohibition against aggressive warfare. however it is de-
fined. 
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